Ernst Cassirer's The Question of Rousseau, 1932

The main object and accomplishment of this book is to defend present a view of Rousseau’s thought that seeks its “dynamic center” and resolves its apparent contradictions.

In the course of doing so, Cassirer also aims to defend Rousseau from charges of irrationalism.

I recall a professor from undergrad making a comment about the notorious difficulty of interpreting Rousseau due to his frequent (apparent) self-contradiction, maybe in regard to some question I had about the general will. Her response had the tenor of resignation, and left a long-lasting impression on me that Rousseau was the sort of non-systematic thinker from whom one could find textual justification for many conflicting stances, and that attempting really understand what Rousseau meant was probably a pointless task.

Cassirer’s book does a good job of attempting to undo that impression, and I gather from the introduction that it was one of the first and most successful to do so. But one is often left with the impression, or at list uneasy feeling, that the contradictions or tensions in Rousseau are dissolved rather than resolved, and that this is accomplished by essentially making Rousseau into a (proto) Kantian.

Cassirer claims several times in the book that the only person to really understand Rousseau was Kant. It is a surprising claim that the philosopher generally regarded as one of the great system builders and champions of rigor would have been as drawn to Rousseau as Kant was, but Cassirer makes a fairly persuasive argument.

  • Rousseau resisted, if not rejected outright, the forms of eudaimonism that were prevalent in 18th century philosophy. His goal was not happiness per se, where that is understood as the satisfaction of “merely” physical/animal/instinctual—one might say empirical (though Cassirer does not)—desires/needs/wants.
  • Rousseau’s elevation/celebration of sentiment was, Cassirer argues, based in a view of this faculty as distinctly rational rather than (again) physical. The claim doesn’t receive as much attention from Cassirer as it probably merits.
  • The political and ethical end (is it fair to say that Cassirer considers these to be more or less inseparable, even fused in Rousseau? I think so) that Rousseau seeks is strongly reminiscent of Kant’s “Kingdom of ends”. Rousseau sharply rejects melioristic political projects (espoused by his contemporaries e.g. Voltaire, the Encylopedists) that would seek only to remove some of the current political ills. Rather a radical (I don’t think Cassirer—or at least his translator—uses this word, would he accept it?) transformation is necessary.

Some problems or questions I have

Cassirer doesn’t address the sort of “lift off” problem presented by Rousseau’s politico-ethical vision. The perfect state will create the ideal citizen through its enlightened educational program who finds his will truly realized by the general will. But how to build this perfect state from where we are?

Even granting that Cassirer does find a consistent core, a “dynamic center” of Rousseau’s thought, how fair is it to say that this core is the true core? How much of Rousseau do we lose by making of him a Kantian?

The brief discussion of Rousseau’s picture of the formation/cultivation (Cassirer does not seem to use these words) of reason in the child recalls what are in my opinion the unresolvable issues with Kant’s picture as well. Reason in the child is said to be a sort of “talent”, latent, undeveloped. But Kant’s transcendental theory of mind cannot account for a partially developed rational faculty, one that is not fully free—especially one that is not fully free due to physical limitations such as are obviously present in young children (i.e. their brains are less developed). Kant similarly struggles with his treatment of anthropology and how feeling (Gesinnung, iirc) relates to morality. By reading him in a Kantian light, Cassirer’s Rousseau becomes subject to the same aporias. Which may be fair: they are not unique to Kant.